The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released an interim final rule (IFR) on November 16, 2026, requiring licenses for exports, re-exports, and transfers of advanced AI chips and servers to data centers anywhere in the world if those facilities provide or will provide compute to companies headquartered in China, Macau, or other Country Group D:5 destinations1,2,15. The rule targets a loophole that allowed Chinese developers to access U.S. computing power remotely through overseas data centers, circumventing existing export controls16. The Commerce Department said it was closing a gap that previously allowed foreign rivals including China, Russia, and Iran to bypass export curbs by renting access to chips from data centers in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brazil3.
BIS said the rule was written by and at the direction of the Treasury Department and the National Security Council, rather than Commerce alone. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Treasury, State, the Department of War, and the U.S. Trade Representative had favored adding Megaspeed to the Entity List for months. Singapore's Ministry of Energy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Digital Development and Information (MDDI) said they were studying the details of the new measure carefully and engaging affected companies to understand the potential impact on their businesses11. The two ministries said they had been engaging the relevant U.S. authorities on the scope and implementation of the measure and were exploring how to facilitate trusted access for Singapore companies.
The action follows the resignation of Nvidia Corp. CEO Jensen Huang, which Fortune reported took place on a Thursday, after revelations that he had an affair with Alice Huang (no relation), a former executive at Megaspeed, a Singaporean company suspected of funneling controlled chips to China17,18[2]. U.S. investigators allege that Alice Huang used industry contacts and shell companies to gain access to 240,000 chips banned for export to China13,12. Megaspeed and its Malaysian affiliate, Speedmatrix, purchased about $4.8 billion in Nvidia AI chips and other hardware over three years. Megaspeed said it conducts legitimate and lawful business and has retained external legal counsel to conduct a thorough internal investigation. On November 13, Malaysia said it was investigating Speedmatrix over possible diversion of chips to other countries. Huang's exit heightened concerns that China and other nations could access Nvidia's advanced chips by renting computing resources through data centers in Southeast Asia. The IFR formally rescinds the Biden administration's AI Diffusion Rule from January 2025, which sought to impose country-level limits on exports of advanced AI chips and restrict transfers of certain powerful AI models. The Trump administration argued in May that the earlier framework added unnecessary restrictions on U.S. companies and allies, and said it would discard it.
Scope and thresholds
The remote-access rules target companies based in the D:5 group of embargoed countries, which includes China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and 18 others. The United States already requires chip companies to obtain a license to ship AI chips to companies based in, or owned by any business in, that group. The IFR extends that logic to remote compute access, covering indirect access: a data-center customer outside Country Group D:5 can bring a transaction within scope if it trains models for, participates in training models for, or supplies models to a D:5 company. Overseas data centers that serve companies in countries including China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba are required to identify their end users10.
The rule's central licensing threshold is more than 12 million aggregate total processing performance (TPP), which can be reached at one data center or across digitally linked infrastructure. Twelve million TPP roughly works out to the maximum computing power of about 750 Nvidia H100 or H200 chips. The rule covers advanced U.S.-made chips including Nvidia's Blackwell line and later generations. The restrictions also cover companies whose ultimate parent is headquartered in China, Macau, or other restricted destinations, as well as intermediaries that train or supply AI models on their behalf.
The IFR also adds new licensing requirements for chip exports, re-exports, or transfers of advanced semiconductors to Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Brazil, which the Commerce Department said present a higher-than-normal risk of diversion19. Applications for licenses involving those five countries will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. For those destinations, the license requirements will not apply to chips destined for companies headquartered in the United States, provided exporters meet specified reporting requirements.
Compliance obligations and timeline
Exporters and data center operators must monitor their customers' ownership structures and activities to ensure they are not run by anyone from the D:5 group. Foreign data centers are required to conduct due diligence on customers, including examining direct and indirect ownership or control by entities based in restricted destinations. Existing data center operators providing services that fall under the new rule must obtain licenses within 90 days of the rule coming into effect. The Commerce Department is allowing 60 days for public comments. The new regulations will take effect upon publication in the Federal Register.
The rule does not apply to commercial recommendation systems, such as those used in e-commerce or social media. BIS may offer exemptions for American-operated data centers in the affected countries.
The Commerce Department stated that access to such computing power "can be used to train and run advanced SI models capable of supporting military- and intelligence-related activities that could threaten U.S. national security or foreign policy interests". Among the threats cited, the department said rivals could use advanced AI to develop "more effective weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons, coordinated cyber-espionage and targeted cyber-disruption, algorithmic theft, and weaponized disinformation".
On the legislative side, the House of Representatives voted 369–22 on January 12, 2026, to pass the Remote Access Security Act, which aimed to give BIS clear legal authority over remote access to sensitive technology. The Senate has not moved the bill forward. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick has agreed to testify before the Senate Banking Committee on December 10.
ANALYSIS By extending controls from physical chip shipments to remote compute access and covering indirect model-training relationships, the IFR closes a gap that left the existing export-control regime incomplete: barring chip sales while permitting cloud-based access to the same hardware offered a straightforward workaround. The 90-day compliance window and the due-diligence mandate on ownership structures place new operational burdens on data center operators globally.