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VECTOR WIREAI INTELLIGENCE
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AI Research Radar

Today: 48 papers cleared of 536 scanned, led by Multi-Reward Hacking. Qwen3 is the literature’s most-referenced model (7 papers in the loaded window).
UPDATED 1M AGO
WED 19 AUG — 312 scanned · 31 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 20 AUG — 297 scanned · 18 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 21 AUG — 215 scanned · 18 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionMON 24 AUG — 299 scanned · 34 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 25 AUG — 636 scanned · 68 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionWED 26 AUG — 345 scanned · 28 cleared · 0 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 27 AUG — 344 scanned · 27 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 28 AUG — 407 scanned · 51 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionMON 31 AUG — 296 scanned · 24 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 01 SEP — 773 scanned · 73 cleared · 5 frontier — click to open this editionWED 02 SEP — 463 scanned · 41 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 03 SEP — 322 scanned · 37 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 04 SEP — 326 scanned · 20 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionMON 07 SEP — 348 scanned · 37 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionWED 09 SEP — 920 scanned · 80 cleared · 7 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 10 SEP — 296 scanned · 30 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 11 SEP — 265 scanned · 36 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionSAT 12 SEP — 46 scanned · 5 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionMON 14 SEP — 295 scanned · 18 cleared · 0 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 15 SEP — 709 scanned · 77 cleared · 7 frontier — click to open this editionWED 16 SEP — 362 scanned · 38 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 17 SEP — 423 scanned · 34 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 18 SEP — 425 scanned · 32 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionMON 21 SEP — 327 scanned · 31 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 22 SEP — 797 scanned · 62 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionWED 23 SEP — 451 scanned · 31 cleared · 4 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 24 SEP — 330 scanned · 43 cleared · 5 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 25 SEP — 448 scanned · 50 cleared · 5 frontier — click to open this editionMON 28 SEP — 385 scanned · 37 cleared · 2 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 29 SEP — 1,559 scanned · 109 cleared · 7 frontier — click to open this editionWED 30 SEP — 824 scanned · 93 cleared · 4 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 01 OCT — 669 scanned · 77 cleared · 5 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 02 OCT — 673 scanned · 57 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionMON 05 OCT — 441 scanned · 51 cleared · 1 frontier — click to open this editionTUE 06 OCT — 932 scanned · 83 cleared · 8 frontier — click to open this editionWED 07 OCT — 573 scanned · 49 cleared · 6 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 08 OCT — 532 scanned · 34 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 09 OCT — 565 scanned · 63 cleared · 6 frontier — click to open this editionMON 12 OCT — 374 scanned · 26 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionWED 14 OCT — 1,450 scanned · 173 cleared · 14 frontier — click to open this editionTHU 15 OCT — 499 scanned · 39 cleared · 6 frontier — click to open this editionFRI 16 OCT — 536 scanned · 48 cleared · 3 frontier — click to open this editionAUGSEPOCT
60 DAYS · 21,489 SCANNED
2,013 CLEARED · 139 ◆
TODAY — FRI 16 OCT 202648 cleared of 536 · 3 FRONTIER
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
Multi-Reward Hacking: From Aggregation-Induced Drift to Trust-Anchored Defense
To improve task performance while encouraging desirable response properties, LLM post-training often combines a primary reward (e.g., correctness) with auxiliary rewards (e.g., brevity or efficiency). However, how these rewards are aggregated can critically affect training outcomes. We show that symmetric aggregation, which treats reward channels equally, can induce a failure where aggregate reward improves while pri…
reward-hackingmulti-reward-rlrlhfaggregation-drift
AmazonYushu Li, Jiin Woo, Xiaoxiao Li, et al. (4)cs.LG · cs.AIarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
From Research Goals to Scientific Closure: Evaluating Agents Through Evidence-Supported Physics Research
Can AI agents organize scientific investigations that lead to well-supported conclusions? To evaluate this capability, we introduce PhysClosureBench, a benchmark of 50 expert-verified, goal-specified research tasks spanning strong-field, attosecond, and neighboring physics areas. Each task specifies the research objective and essential scientific constraints, while leaving the agent to organize the investigation and…
agent-evaluationscientific-reasoningphysics-benchmarkevidence-based
Yijia Mao, Song Dai, Tao Chen, et al. (10)cs.AIarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
REKI: Registering Knowledge in VLAs
We introduce REKI, a 2.4B vision-language-action model (VLA) pretrained exclusively on public data that sets a new Pareto frontier between performance and model size: on LIBERO-Plus, RoboTwin Clean2Rand and RoboCasa365, it is outperformed only by models about twice its size. REKI consists of a vision-language model (VLM) followed by a flow-matching action expert, and is pretrained on a curated mixture of public robot…
vision-language-actionvlaflow-matchingrobotics
Juliette Marrie, Paul Pacaud, Adrien Ramanana Rahary, et al. (5)cs.RO · cs.CV · cs.LGarXiv ↗PDF ↗Code ↗
THE INDEX — 45 MORE CLEARED
●My Credentials, Please: Detecting Filesystem Capability Laundering in MCP Servers at Scalecs.CR
●Poisoning the corpora of protein design systems during pre-training and retrievalcs.LG · q-bio.QM
●CodeHealth Predicts the Token Cost of Agentic Code Review: A Pre-Registered Study of 465 Agent-Authored Pull Requestscs.SE · cs.AI
●BiShield-TEE: On the (In-)Security of Unilateral Weight Obfuscation in On-Device TEE-Shielded LLM Partitioncs.CR · cs.AI
●Approve What, Exactly? Effect Binding and Trusted Rendering for Agent Step-Up Authorizationcs.CR · cs.AI
●FAOPs: Normal Forms and an Algebra for AI Agent Workflowscs.AI · cs.DB
●Trigger Value Selection in Clean-Label Malware Backdoors: An Effectiveness-Detectability Analysiscs.CR
●A team of Gemini 4 Argon agents beats MinecraftGooglecs.AI
●Making every stage of medical device document assessment with large language models deterministiccs.CL · cs.IR
●Fast-VLA: You Only Think Once for Robot Manipulationcs.RO
●Architecting for Hardware Diversity: Meta's End-to-End Co-Design for High-Performance AI Training on AMD GPUsMetacs.DC · cs.AR
●Poisoning the Neighborhood: A Topology-Aware Topic-Level Attack on Large-Scale HNSW-based RAG Systemscs.CR
●MSP: Modality Self-Play for Training Multimodal LLMs Without Paired Cross-Modal DataAmazoncs.AI · cs.CV
●What Should We Remove? Evaluating the Reliability and Costs of RLVR Data Decontaminationcs.CL · cs.LG
●LEASH: Uncertainty-Aware Weak-to-Strong Escalation and Oversight for Computer-Use Agentscs.AI
●Time to Fake It: Continual Machine Learning Intensifies Unfairness in Deepfake Detectioncs.LG · cs.AI
●Encoded but Exposed: Language Embeddings can Reveal More Than They Should in Recommender Systemscs.CR · cs.AI
●TRACER: Trajectory-Aware Tool Retrieval for LLM AgentsMicrosoftcs.CL · cs.AI
●Spark-0: Scaling Spatially Aligned Tactile Pretraining for Robot Dexterous Manipulationcs.RO
●Whole-Body DexterityAmazoncs.RO · cs.AI
●PAGE404: Breaking GPU Isolation Through Hardware-assisted Page Migrationcs.CR · cs.AR
●Resisting Harmful Instructions through Training-Free Weight Editingcs.LG
●MindEval2: Clinically Grounded Patients and Rubrics for Evaluating Language Models in Mental Health SupportNVIDIAcs.CL
●PocketTSLM: Deploying an On-Device Soft-Prompt Time-Series Language Model for Privacy-Preserving Smartphone Reasoningcs.LG · cs.CL
●Open Benchmark of AI Impact on Humans (ImpactBench): an expert-guided, open platform for the holistic evaluation of AI impact on humanscs.HC · cs.AI
●When Reasoning Is Not Enough: Proactive Inquiry for Cross-Modal Safety in Multimodal Large Language Modelscs.AI
●What do AI chatbots do after users decline therapeutic redirection for suicide thoughts?cs.HC · cs.AI
●Can Autonomous Vehicles Keep Their Cool? A Survey of Thermal Side-Channel and Perception Attackscs.CR
●INFUSE: A Unified Surface Benchmark for Indirect Prompt Injection in Agentic Systemscs.CR · cs.AI
●What Survives Self-Evolution: Provenance Marks in Copied Agent Harnessescs.CR
●A Multi-Tiered AI Accessibility Model (MAIAM): Proportionate Access and Capability Limits for Comprehensive Frontier AI Safetycs.AI · cs.MA
●From Detection to Decision: Calibration and Deferral for Prompt-Injection Detectioncs.CR
●Private Retrieval Augmented Generation via Random Projectioncs.AI · cs.CR
●Disagreement-Guided Weak-to-Strong Routingcs.AI
●PRISM: Transfer and Limits of Activation Interventions in Tool-Calling Language Modelscs.CL
●Beyond Generation: Using Multimodal LLMs as Detectors of LLM-Generated Deepfake Facial Imagescs.CV · cs.ET
●FIRM: Fisher-Informed Retention Merging for Federated LLM Unlearningcs.LG · cs.AI
●Thinking in Graphs: Neo4j-Backed Exploit-Chain Reasoning for LLM Penetration-Testing Agentscs.CR
●QuasiLeak-Bench: Evaluating LLM-Based Privacy Detectors on Policy-Conditioned Quasi-Evidence Group Recoverycs.CL · cs.CR
●VoteGEO-Bench: Measuring the Impact of Generative Engine Optimization on Electoral Visibilitycs.IR · cs.CL
●Visual Sanad: Auditing Vision-Language Models for False Acceptance of Qur'anic Citationscs.CV
●Screwtape: Adversarial Transcript Editing for Monitor Red-Teamingcs.CR · cs.AI
●The World Won't Wait: Evaluating and Teaching Agents Under a Live Clockcs.AI
●Stronger Judges Do Not See More: Deployment-Integrity Blindness in LLM Evaluationcs.CR · cs.AI
●Analog RF Computing for Integrated Data and AI Flows Over Wireless Networkscs.IT · cs.ET
THU 15 OCT 202639 cleared of 499 · 6 FRONTIER
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
DANGERLENS: Probing Dangerous Representations Hidden by Safety Alignment
Safety alignment teaches language models to refuse harmful requests, yet the internal accessibility of hazardous concepts can retain traces of earlier training. Can checkpoints with equally safe behavior differ in what remains accessible behind their refusals? In this work, we investigate this question through paired training histories and a direct audit of intermediate representations. We introduce DANGERLENS, a pro…
model-safetydangerous-representationsrepresentation-auditingalignment-evaluation
Tianzhuo Yang, Shaoheng Yan, Lin Lu, et al. (8)cs.AIarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
From Training to Escalation: Forensic Analysis and Local Recreation of RL/RLHF-Induced Privilege Escalation in AI Agents (CVE-2026-65616)
Mid-2026 reporting on autonomous AI evaluation incidents claimed that frontier large language model (LLM) agents escaped server containment through emergent coordination and cloud infrastructure attacks. This paper contextualizes those claims through forensic analysis and containerized recreation of both the Highly Persistent Internal Model (HPIM) training-case conditions and the Phase One privilege escalation target…
rlhfprivilege-escalationagent-securityforensic-analysis
Alicia Colmenero-Fern\'andezcs.MA · cs.AI · cs.CRarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
CyberArena: Benchmarking AI Agents in Live Symmetric Attack-and-Defense Combat
AI agents are demonstrating increasingly strong offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities in the real world. Current benchmarks mostly evaluate agents in isolation against static targets. Real cyber operations, however, are dynamic and coupled: security postures constantly change as attackers and defenders adapt to each other in real time. Static benchmarks quickly saturate and miss an agent's ability to att…
ai-agentscybersecuritybenchmarkingattack-defense
Bangya Liu, Jianhong Tu, Yueyang Pan, et al. (10)cs.CR · cs.AI · cs.MAarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
Diagnosing and Correcting Reward Hacking in Verifiable Instruction Following
Verifiable instruction-following benchmarks emphasize output-constraint satisfaction but can overlook whether responses meaningfully answer the underlying request, creating an evaluation blind spot. We show that frontier models can receive full credit for responses with little substantive answer content. Using the same verifier-based criterion as a training reward can induce reward hacking, as publicly released check…
reward-hackinginstruction-followingverifiable-evalsverifier-reward
Sangyeon Yoon, Wooseok Seo, Hamish Ivison, et al. (8)cs.LG · cs.CLarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
LLM-jp-4 Technical Report
This paper presents LLM-jp-4, a family of Japanese sovereign large language models (LLMs) developed with an emphasis on transparency, reproducibility, and practical usability. LLM-jp-4 comprises an 8B dense model and a 32B-A3B mixture-of-experts model, both trained from scratch on approximately 12 trillion tokens. To support independent verification and reproduction, we establish explicit criteria for selecting train…
sovereign-llmmixture-of-expertsreproducibilityllm-training
LLM-jp, :, Chaoran Liu, et al. (10)cs.CL · cs.AIarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
ChemArgus: Automated Scientific Diagnostics for Lab-Grade Multimodal Chemistry Reasoning: A Frontier Benchmark
Chemistry evaluation has moved past multiple-choice probes toward open-ended expert problems, yet the benchmarks that define the current frontier still score answer endpoints alone. Such scoring conflates memorized facts with stepwise derivation, treats visual and textual inputs as interchangeable, and confounds long-horizon planning with stepwise execution. These blind spots prevent any diagnosis of where the reason…
multimodal-chemistrybenchmarkingreasoning-diagnosticsopen-ended-evaluation
Hanyao Guo, Mo Cui, Zihan Tan, et al. (10)cs.LGarXiv ↗PDF ↗
THE INDEX — 33 MORE CLEARED
●Discovering Undisclosed Concepts in LoRA Adapters for Diffusion-Based AIGC Modelscs.AI · cs.LG
●TRACER: Trace-Regularized Training Against Indirect Prompt Injectioncs.LG
●What You Sign Is Not What You Run: The Verifiability Gap in Quantized LLM Supply Chainscs.CR · cs.LG
●Glance Forcing: Making Bidirectional Diffusion Autoregressive at a Glancecs.CV
●Safe-FCL: Continual Risk Awareness and Fine-Grained Safety Aggregation for Federated Continual Learning of LLMscs.LG · cs.AI
●Similar Models, Broken Odds: Where Luce's Axiom Fails in Chatbot Arenacs.CL · cs.LG
●ListQA: A Benchmark for Evaluating List-Formatted Factual Knowledge Retrieval in Large Language ModelsAmazoncs.AI · cs.CL
●Kandinsky S2V 1.0: Audio-Driven Avatar Video Generationcs.CV
●Human Demonstrations as Post-Training Data for Any Robot Body: Retargeting the Object, Not the Handcs.RO · cs.AI
●Beyond Static Cues: Unified Dynamic Detection of MLLM Backdoors via Dual-Flow Trajectory Analysiscs.CV · cs.AI
●Whose turn is it? Context-guided model routing for stateful agentsMicrosoftcs.AI
●When Non-Adversarial Noise Hurts Learning: Benchmarking Skill Self-Evolution in Agentscs.LG
●GeoCloak: An Agentic Framework for Semantics-Preserving Geolocation Privacy via Peripheral Clue Manipulationcs.CV · cs.AI
●J-tau: A Fully Localized Japanese Benchmark for Tool-Agent-User Interactioncs.CL
●Analyzing and Mitigating Poisoning Attacks on Flow-Based Intrusion Detectioncs.CR · cs.LG
●Moral Combat: Exploiting Moral Foundations Theory to Jailbreak LLMscs.CL · cs.CY
●Verifier-Grounded Agentic RL for Provably Correct CodeAmazoncs.LG
●When Protection Overrides Consequences: Understanding Protection Mode in Large Language Model Decision-Makingcs.AI
●What Makes a Social Agent's Interactions Effective? Learning from Verifiable Outcomes in Paired WorldsAlibabacs.CL · cs.AI
●GraphRAG-LTM: A Layered Threat Modeling Framework for Attacks on Graph Retrieval-Augmented Generationcs.CL
●One-shot Human Video-Guided Adaptation for Vision-Language-Action Modelscs.RO
●Energy Consumption Analysis of Discrete Diffusion and Autoregressive Language Modelscs.LG
●No Way To Steal My Face: Proactive Defense Against Identity-Preserving Personalized Generationcs.CV · cs.CR
●FACT: A Multimodal Force-Action-Track Foundation Model for Human-to-Robot DexterityMicrosoftcs.RO
●Who Should We Listen to More? Welfare-Aware Preference Acquisition for Pluralistic Alignmentcs.LG · cs.AI
●Training Language Models to Fail Gracefullycs.LG
●Calibration and Risk-Budgeted Decisions with System One Modelsstat.ML · cs.LG
●Qwen-MT-Lumen at WMT2026: Instruction-Specialized Translation via Quality-Aware Training and On-Policy DistillationAlibabacs.CL
●Into the Unknown: Benchmarking AI agents on open scientific research problemscs.AI · cs.CL
●Safe Reinforcement Learning with Receding-Horizon Safety Critic and Differentiable Action Shieldscs.RO
●λ₀: Scaling Open-World Egocentric Human Data for Humanoid Loco-ManipulationAlibabacs.RO · cs.CV
●P2Patch: Exploit-Guided Vulnerability Repaircs.CR · cs.AI
●Did the LLM Answer the Question? A Semantic Reconstruction Game for Jailbreak Evaluationcs.LG · cs.CR
WED 14 OCT 2026173 cleared of 1,450 · 14 FRONTIER
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
What the Model Cannot See: Covert and Provable Text Invisibility in LLMs
Text wrapped in a trigger can be made behaviorally invisible to a language model: omitted from summaries and quotations, ignored in question answering, and left unflagged by downstream filtering. We study this selective blindness as a dual-use information-flow primitive, a supply-chain backdoor, and a white-box auditing problem. We first implement it exactly as a serving-time span veto: blocking information flow out…
llm-safetyinformation-flowbackdoorsauditing
MicrosoftMark Russinovichcs.CR · cs.AIarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
LensErase: A Foundation Model for Erase Anything
We introduce LensErase, a general-purpose mask-based Erase Anything foundation model designed to cover a broad spectrum of real-world erase scenarios. LensErase supports diverse objects, visual text, watermarks, associated visual effects, multiple-object removal, and a wide range of object scales, aspect ratios, and image resolutions. First, to enable such broad coverage, we construct LensErase-100M, a large-scale da…
image-editingfoundation-modelinpaintingwatermark-removal
MicrosoftYunuo Chen, Xiuyu Wu, Qinhong Yang, et al. (10)cs.CVarXiv ↗PDF ↗
◆ FRONTIER·INDUSTRY IMPACT
Copying Is Not Grounding: Training Faithful Long-Form RAG with Authored-Sentence Credit
In search engines and assistants, long-form RAG answers can mislead readers with claims their sources do not support. Faithfulness rewards, the share of supported sentences, train models toward fewer such claims. We show that these rewards are hacked by copying. A sentence copied from the passages is supported almost by construction, so trained models learn to copy rather than ground what they write. Common defenses…
faithful-ragreward-hackinglong-form-generationretrieval-augmented-generation
Hoang Pham, Duc Anh Vu, Duy Tung Doan, et al. (5)cs.CLarXiv ↗PDF ↗
THE INDEX — 10 MORE CLEARED
●Releasing the Inner Jev: A Simple Recipe for Open Decision Modelscs.AI
●CT0: Cybersecurity Transformercs.CR
●Which Optimizer Leaks Most? Optimizer Implicit Bias as a Training-Data Privacy Controllercs.LG · cs.AI
●Test-Time Compute for Humanoid Behavior Foundation Modelscs.RO
●EAIR: Interaction Risks in Enterprise LLM Multi-Agent SystemsMicrosoftcs.MA
●Steertuning Policies from a Few Human Videoscs.RO · cs.AI
●Language2Drive: Do Vision-Language-Action Models Really Follow the Instructions in Autonomous Driving?Amazoncs.RO · cs.CV
●TRACE: Temporal Risk Assessment and Concept Editing for Safer Language Generationcs.AI · cs.LG
●Terrain Traversal Without Motion Priors: Expert-Routed Humanoid Locomotion at Deployment Fidelitycs.RO
●Robust Detection of Directional Adversarial Attacks in Deep Neural Networks for Radiological Imagingcs.CV · cs.CR
loading earlier editions…
THE FIELD — 19,344 · 30D
cs.AI5,307
cs.LG4,514
cs.CL2,682
cs.CV2,308
cs.RO2,132
cs.CR764
every indexed paper — the whole wire, not just what cleared
IN THE LITERATURE
models referenced in the loaded window · click to pivot
FROM INSIDE THE LABS
papers with a frontier-lab author · click to pivot
Research — every claim one click from the paperarXiv continuous index · FRONTIER ◆ leads each edition